LONDON NUCLEAR WARFARE TRIBUNAL
Evidence,
Commentary, and Judgment
7.2 Judgment of the Tribunal
The London Nuclear Warfare Tribunal was convened in
London from the 3rd to the 6th of January, 1985 for the express purpose
of conducting An Examination of the Legality of Nuclear
Weapons. The members of the Tribunal, having considered the oral
and written evidence presented during the four days of hearings, and
having engaged in independent inquiry into the legal issues raised,
DECLARE THAT
- Any reliance on the threat or first use of nuclear weapons is a
violation of international law, and constitutes a Crime against
Humanity as set forth in the Nuremberg Principle 6(c);
- Strategic doctrines and official war plans that contemplate first
use or first strike with nuclear weapons constitute serious violations
of international law, even if postures are only preparatory and
contingent, and never are consummated in the form of an actual threat
or use of nuclear weapons;
- The development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons
systems with first-strike characteristics are aggravated instances of
unlawful preparations for the sake of national security, and constitute
a violation of the Nuremberg prohibition on plans and conspiracies to
wage aggressive war;
- The use of nuclear weapons in a retaliatory mode, after prior armed
attack and in accordance with the concept of self-defence in the United
Nations Charter, is nevertheless unlawful unless such use is
discriminate, proportionate, and without poisonous or cruel effects;
since it seems impossible to satisfy such criteria, any use of nuclear
weapons, whatever the pretext or justification, is an unlawful and
criminal act of war entailing both governmental and individual
responsibility;
- As a consequence of (4), any form of deterrent threat to use
nuclear weapons, even if limited to defensive and retaliatory
situations, is a continuing violation of the laws of war; at minimum,
overcoming deterrence with all deliberate speed is an implicit legal
duty for political and military leaders representing governments of
nuclear weapons states;
- Political and military leaders of the nuclear weapons states have
also failed to fulfil the legal duty imposed by the preamble of the
Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963)
and Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
to pursue in good faith negotiations seeking general and complete
disarmament
and an end to all forms of nuclear testing; the continual innovation in
weapons systems, seeking maximum military advantage, has brought into
being an accelerating arms race with sporadic and mainly propagandistic
efforts to achieve progress toward disarmament;
- Currently proposed extensions of the arms race to outer space,
especially in the form of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI),
constitute separate violations of International Law, and appear
incompatible with such existing international treaties as the Outer
Space Treaty (1967),
Article 1 of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), and the Anti Ballistic
Missile Treaty (1972);
- Planning and preparation for nuclear war also violate the sovereign
rights of neutral states
to the extent that it causes anxiety about the harmful effects of such
warfare and involves the use of weapons of mass destruction whose
primary and secondary lethal effects cannot be confined to the
territory of belligerent states; such violations of neutral rights are
dramatized by the recent experimental indications that extensive
nuclear explosions could cause "a nuclear winter", with
catastrophic climatic consequences for the northern hemisphere, and
possibly beyond;
- Planning and preparation for nuclear war undermine the development
and maintenance of political democracy and constitutional government in
the nuclear weapons states;
- Any statement by any Government to the effect that the 1977 Geneva
Protocols were not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate
or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, is ineffective for the purposes
of avoiding criminal liability under international law for the
possession or use of nuclear weapons by any State, and such statement
does not reduce or eliminate individual criminal responsibility in
international law for the citizens of such or other states.
On the basis of these conclusions, the Tribunal underscores the
following implications.
© 1985-2005 Geoffrey Darnton. All rights reserved. gdarnton@nuclearwarfaretribunal.org